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From Regulation to Behaviour Change: Giving Nudge the Third Degree 
 
Robert Baldwin* 
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Behaviour change strategies such as ‘nudge’ have become hugely popular with administrations on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Nudging, however, is a practice that raises both conceptual and controversial 
issues and these have to be addressed in examining  the conditions under which nudging can be used 
effectively and acceptably. Hitherto there has been a lack of conceptual clarity in many debates about 
nudge but a key to understanding nudge-related issues is to distinguish between three very different 
degrees of nudge. These three degrees raise different, and identifiable, concerns and it is possible to 
assess the extent to which these worries can be responded to in positive terms. The compatibility of 
nudging with other control devices cannot be assumed and, when contemplating nudging, it is essential 
to be clear and open about the philosophical basis for such action as well as to be aware that different 
modes of intervention may operate with clashes of logic that threaten not only effectiveness but also 
the serving of representative and ethical ends. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
‘Nudging’ involves structuring the choices that people make so as to lead them 
towards particular outcomes. Placing fruit next to the supermarket till, for example, 
gives a nudge towards healthy eating. Such ‘behaviour change’ strategies have 
become hugely popular with administrations on both sides of the Atlantic. In the UK, 
David Cameron set up a Behavioural Insights Team (or ‘Nudge Unit’) at the centre of 
UK government in 2010
1
 so as to foster alternatives to traditional regulation and to 
move towards less-restrictive and lower-cost controls of behaviour. The governmental 
endorsement of nudging has not, however, been based on clear positions regarding the 
nature of ‘nudge’ or the role of nudge  in the array of state control devices. 
      This article seeks to address these deficiencies and presents three central 
arguments. First, that, before nudging is further embraced, it is necessary to think 
much more clearly about the concept of nudge and to distinguish between the 
different degrees of nudge that can be applied to targets. Second, that different 
degrees of nudge can present distinct issues of effectiveness and can give rise to 
separate concerns of a representative and ethical nature. Third, that a number of 
important issues are easily overlooked if nudge is seen as just another mode of 
influence in the toolbox of state controls. 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science. The author is 
grateful for the comments of Vanessa Finch, Veerle Heyvaert, Andrew Lang, Martin Lodge, 
Henry Rothstein and the anonymous referees. 
 
1
 The Behavioural Insights Team (BIT, or 'Nudge Unit') was set up in July 2010 with a remit 
to find innovative ways of encouraging, enabling and supporting people to make better 
choices for themselves. Professor Richard Thaler was appointed as an external expert to the 
BIT - See more at: http://blogs.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/behavioural-insights-
team/author/behavioural-insights-team/#sthash.mxq3kUis.dpuf 
In early 2014 the nudge unit was part-privatised by sale to a charity and to employees. See: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-26030205 
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        The article starts by outlining the rise of ‘nudge’ before reviewing the concept of 
nudge and distinguishing between three different degrees of nudge. It then explores 
the limits to the effectiveness of the nudge strategy and the representational and 
ethical problems posed by the different degrees of nudge. The conditions for effective 
and acceptable use of nudge are then investigated before the role of nudge in relation 
to other intervention methods is explored. Emphasis will be placed on the dangers 
involved in seeing nudge as simply as an extra option in the toolbox of control 
devices. Finally, conclusions will be offered on the feasibility of constructing a 
conceptual and ethical basis for making choices regarding this fashionable 
intervention tool.  
 
THE RISE OF NUDGE 
The idea of ‘nudge’ is commonly associated with the book of that title published by 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in 2008.
2
 The two authors define a ‘nudge’ as: ‘… 
any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable 
way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives. To count as a nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid.’3 In 
this conception the ‘choice architecture’ is the environment that frames an 
individual’s choice. Thus: ‘Putting the fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning 
junk food does not.’4 
         The proponents of nudge build on the well-established insights of cognitive 
psychology and behavioural economics to contend that control systems need to take 
on board the bounded rationality of citizens when they make daily decisions.
5
 
Individuals are seen as constrained by limitations of information, cognitive capacity 
and self-control and as tending  to rely on a series of heuristics and shorthand methods 
of using information.
6
 As a result, they often make poor decisions that do not serve 
their welfare. Nudging holds that citizens’ choices tend to be influenced by a host of 
framing factors – such as the ways in which options are presented – and it advocates  
structuring choice architectures so that it is easier for consumers or others (such as 
regulated firms) to act in ways that are beneficial to them.
7
 
      At the heart of nudging is a philosophy entitled ‘libertarian paternalism’.8 Thus, 
nudge is said to possess a paternalistic dimension in stimulating choices that are seen 
                                                 
2
 R. Thaler and C. Sunstein, Nudge (New Haven: Yale UP, 2008; revised as Penguin 2009). 
See also the two authors’ ‘Libertarian Paternalism’ (2003) 93 American Economic Review 
175-179; ‘Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron (2003) 70 University of Chicago Law 
Review 1159-1202’. 
3
 Thaler and Sunstein 2008, n 2 above, 6 (page references in this article are to the revised 
Penguin edition of 2009). 
4
 ibid. p.8. 
5
 On such insights see e.g. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, ‘Judgement Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases’ (1974) 185 Science 1124-1131; H. Simon, Administrative Behaviour 
(Fourth Edition) (New York: The Free Press, 1997). 
6
 Thaler and Sunstein  2008, n 2 above, Chapter 1) note many factors that lead to mistakes in 
human judgement, such as: optimism and over-confidence; loss aversion; a status quo bias; 
framing; inertia; inattention and error; anchoring; availability; and representativeness. 
7
 In their first example of a nudge, Thaler and Sunstein posit that the food in a school cafeteria 
is arranged so that students are likely to make the most healthy choices Thaler and Sunstein 
2008, n 2 above, 5. 
8
 Thaler and Sunstein 2008, n 2 above, 5-6. 
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as welfare enhancing for the individual but it combines this with a libertarian aspect in 
so far as it purports to leave the target person or firm free to choose to take the non-
sensible course of action.  
      Leaving aside incentive regimes, Thaler and Sunstein give examples of at least 
seven nudge tools.
9
 Defaults encourage the healthy choice by making this the given 
selection unless active steps are taken to avoid this outcome – steps that will not be 
encouraged by the natural tendency to human inertia. A prime example of a default is 
a presumption that all citizens consent to be organ donors unless they register their 
unwillingness to donate (which, as noted, Thaler and Sunstein state, they should be 
able to do easily). Similarly, employees can be enrolled automatically onto a pension 
scheme unless they actively opt out. Persuasive, campaigning and counselling 
strategies can  influence and shape decision-making. Design  approaches can be used 
– as where the main office doors lead directly to the stairs, not the lifts; or the 
departmental smoking zone is placed at a distance from the work area. Commitments 
to healthy activities, such as eating less or charitable giving can be stimulated so as to 
encourage delivery on good intentions. Transactional shortcuts  can be provided so 
that, for example, a special credit card makes charitable donations easy to make and 
record. Exemptions, similarly, can be used to spare people from procedures if they do 
the sensible thing – as where motorcycle helmet users do not have to obtain a licence.             
Information  mechanisms  can be deployed to inform people of pitfalls or errors, or  
to present options in ways that foster healthy decisions,  or to facilitate corrective 
actions. Information can also be given on social norms or other people’s performance 
(e.g. the percentage of citizens who have already completed a tax return)
10
. 
Information  can also be  mapped and structured (especially in relation to complex 
issues) so as to  provide citizens with easier routes to the sensible decision. Warnings 
and reminders can be given so as to discourage unwise actions such as the sending 
of intemperate or uncivil emails.
11
 
     As noted, the Cameron administration set up the Behavioural Insights Team (the 
‘Nudge Unit’) as part of a movement away from command-based regulation and fiscal 
controls in favour of  ‘smarter’ strategies that would use behavioural insights rather 
than rules or financial incentives to influence behaviour. This drift was seen as 
continuing the deregulatory thrust of the Better Regulation Executive and as an 
espousing of ‘non-regulatory means of achieving behaviour change’.12 As for the 
merits of a ‘non-regulatory approach’, the Minister for Government Policy, Oliver 
Letwin MP, stressed four factors: effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, less rigid 
impositions on individuals and reduced burdens on business.  
      Since its inception the BIT has investigated the potential of nudges to improve 
practices relating to such matters as: organ donor registrations, charitable donations, 
energy saving and smoking.
13
 
                                                 
9
 Incentive strategies with economic effects are not nudges as defined by Thaler and Sunstein 
2008, n 2 above, 8.  For a dozen examples of nudges see Thaler and Sunstein (2008) Chapter 
14. 
10
 See e.g. R. Cialdini, ‘Activating and Aligning Social Norms for Persuasive Impact’ (2006) 
Social Influence 3-15. 
11
 The example provided at Thaler and Sunstein 2008, n 2 above, 233-234. 
12
 House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee Second Report of Session 2010-
12  Behaviour Change (HL Paper 179, 2011) (hereafter ‘House of Lords Select Committee, 
2011’) para. 5.3 quoting the evidence of the head of the BIT, Dr David Halpern. 
13
 For details of the BIT’s work see its website: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/behavioural-insights-team 
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THE CONCEPT OF NUDGE 
Understanding what nudging involves is a pre-condition for assessing the 
effectiveness and acceptability of nudge as an intervention strategy – or for evaluating 
any potential use of nudge in a specific context. If the concept of ‘nudge’ is unclear or 
encompasses a number of very different devices this complicates any attempt to 
assess its potential performance. 
       A problem here is that Thaler and Sunstein adopt a conception of the nudge that 
is both broad and contested by some commentators. Thus, the two authors include 
within nudging a number of examples of simple information provision  (e.g. 
requirements that cigarette packs display information on the  risks of smoking; or 
demands that firms inform employees of  work hazards; or  suggestions that red 
warning lights be used to inform of needs to change air filters
14
). They also cloud 
matters by citing, as examples of nudges, some uses of economic incentives (e.g. to 
limit pregnancies
15
) which contradicts their definitional exclusion of fiscal measures 
from the category of nudges.
16
  
      On the matter of simple information supply, some commentators would depart 
from Thaler and Sunstein and omit these activities from the category of ‘nudges’.17 
Thus Peter John and colleagues have (like others) distinguished between ‘nudges’ and 
actions that are taken so as to foster deliberative decision-making processes.
18
  
‘Nudges’, thus conceived, operate by working within the domain of ‘automatic’ (or 
‘System 1’) responses since the essence of nudging is to control individuals by 
exploiting their cognitive and emotional limitations rather than by seeking to improve 
their capacities to exercise informed, rational and conscious choices. In contrast, 
interventions that are based on a ‘think’ strategy are designed to encourage  
‘reflective’ (or ‘System 2’) decision procedures.19 ‘Think’ strategies will enhance 
rationality by supplying information that will be used in reflective decision-making 
(‘These cigarettes may harm your health’). ‘Simple’ information supply, from this 
perspective, is thus inconsistent with nudging as it stimulates conscious decision-
making.  
        Those who disagree with Thaler and Sunstein on this point reinforce their 
position by arguing that simple information provision is not, in any event, covered by 
the idea of ‘libertarian paternalism’ because actions that are taken so as to enhance an 
individual’s exercise of ‘reflective’, rational choice, and which respect the decision-
                                                 
14
 See Thaler and Sunstein 2008, n 2 above, 200-201; 232-233 and D. Hausman and B. 
Welch, ‘Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge’ (2010) 18 The Journal of Political Philosophy 
123-136, 127. 
15
 See Thaler and Sunstein 2008, n 2 above, 232. 
16
 See: British Medical Journal, Editorial ‘One Nudge Forward, Two Steps Back’ (2011) 342 
BMJ d401. 
17
 P. John, G. Smith and G. Stoker, ‘Nudge Nudge, Think Think: Two Strategies for 
Changing Civic Behaviour’ (2009) 80 The Political Quarterly 361-370. The House of Lords 
Select Committee, 2011, similarly took the view, contra Thaler and Sunstein, that: ‘Nudges 
prompt choices without getting people to consider their options consciously, and therefore do 
not include openly persuasive interventions such as media campaigns and the straightforward 
provision of information.’ (para. 2.9).  See also L. Bovens, ‘The Ethics of Nudge’ in T. 
Grune-Yanoff and S. Hansson (eds.) Preference Change (Berlin: Springer, 2008). 
18
 John, Smith and Stoker ibid. 
19
 See Thaler and Sunstein 2008, n 2 above, 21. More generally see D. Kahneman, Thinking, 
Fast and Slow (London: Allen Lane, 2011). 
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making autonomy of the individual, are not paternalistic at all – there is no 
substitution of the judgement of the nudger for that of the individual who is nudged.
20
 
Thaler and Sunstein have, nevertheless, been followed by many policy-makers in 
including ‘simple information’ and other ‘think’ devices alongside ‘System 1’ 
influences within the category of nudges.
21
 
 
THREE DEGREES OF NUDGE 
        The prevalence of the latter, highly inclusive, notion of nudge means that 
distinctions have to be drawn between different degrees of nudge if there is to be 
conceptual clarity on nudging. Nudges, it is argued here, vary in the degree to which 
they impact on the autonomy of individuals as decision-makers and it is useful to 
distinguish between three levels of such impact. This is because distinct sets of 
representative, ethical and practical issues are raised by these three degrees of nudge. 
     It should be noted that the degree of a nudge is a separate matter from the 
particular nudging tool that is deployed (be that a default rule, an exercise in 
information supply or some other approach). Thus, a tool such as supplying 
information may be used, as will be demonstrated, for first, second, or third degree 
nudging. 
      In the framework proposed here, ‘First Degree nudges’ respect the decision-
making autonomy of the individual and enhance reflective decision-making. Typical 
First Degree nudges involve the supply of simple information to individuals or the 
imparting of reminders (‘There are three weeks left to complete the tax return.’). Such 
nudges can be distinguished from two other, more serious, kinds of intervention.  
      A ‘Second Degree nudge’ typically builds on behavioural or volitional limitations 
so as to bias a decision in the desired direction. Thus, a default rule with an opt-out 
can be used to shape decisions (as in presumed consent to organ donation), or the 
physical environment for decision-making may be designed to apply influence (as 
where the office smoking zone is placed at a distance from the work area). Both of 
these examples nudge individuals’ decisions by relying on human inertia. 
       The Second Degree nudge involves a greater impact on individual autonomy than 
the First Degree nudge since the targeted individual’s behavioural or volitional 
limitations and ‘automatic’ responses will in practice lead him or her to accept the 
nudge with limited awareness and reflection. It is, nevertheless, the case both that 
such a nudge will shape an individual’s decision and that the target of the nudge 
would be capable, on reflection, of realising that a nudge has been administered and 
assessing its broad effect. 
      A ‘Third Degree nudge’ offers a yet more serious intrusion on autonomy because 
it involves behavioural manipulation to an extent that other nudges do not. Thus,  
framing devices can be used to shape the decisions and  preferences of an individual 
in a manner that is resistant to unpacking in so far as assessing the nature and extent 
of the nudge is not readily achieved by reflection.
22
 Thus, a campaign to promote 
healthy eating might focus on certain negative consequences that are associated with 
                                                 
20
 See Hausman and  Welch,  n 14 above, 127. 
21
 See e.g. Behavioural Insights Team, Behaviour  Change and Energy Use (London: Cabinet 
Office, 2011) Chapter 2. 
22
 On preferences being sensitive to the way a choice problem is described or ‘framed’ see: P. 
Slovic, ‘The Construction of Preference’ (1995) 50(5) American Psychologist  364 - 371; A. 
Tversky and D. Kahneman, ‘The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice’ (1981) 
211 Science 453-458; J. Payne, J. Bettman and E. Johnson, ‘Behavioural Decision Research: 
A Constructive Processing Perspective’ (1992) 43  Annual Review of Psychology 87 – 131. 
 6 
poor diets so as to structure decisions by giving dominance to particular 
considerations (‘Don’t lose your looks, junk the junk food!’). Reflection makes the 
target aware of the emphasis on ‘looks’ in the example given but not of the  extent of 
preference adjustment  involved in expressing the eating decision as one involving a 
loss, rather than gain; in giving ‘looks’ a dominant position in decisions about healthy 
eating; and in applying the emotive power associated with a loss of looks. The result, 
in cases of preference shaping, is that even reflection makes little difference to the 
individual – it only reinforces the pursuit of the ‘shaped preferences’. In such cases, 
the Third Degree nudge does not so much push the tiller as rig the compass bearing.         
      Another form of Third degree nudge will often rely on salience and affect to 
produce its result. Typically, there is use of the behavioural economist or 
psychologist’s finding that people are influenced by novel, personally relevant or 
vivid examples of, say, a harm.
23
 In such instances the message receiver will be 
motivated emotionally in a manner that stands in the way of reflection. Thus, in the 
smoking context, the cigarette pack would show a graphic display of a corpse. 
(Alternatively, a smoker could be shown a video of a loved one having a heart attack.) 
The element of ‘manipulation’ stems from the use of a level of emotional power so 
that this: ‘Blocks the consideration of all options and threatens the agent’s ability to 
act in accordance with her or his own preferences (as opposed to someone else’s).’24   
         The difference between a Second and a Third Degree nudge is that, with the 
former, the message receiver has the practical potential to uncover the nudge, and 
assess its extent, by the exercise of reflection whereas, in the latter, there is a material 
or complete
25
 blocking of such reflection, or the neutralising of reflection. The 
distinction between Second and Third degree nudges does not turn on a sharp 
differentiation of cognitive, volitional and emotional functions and manipulations, nor 
is it to presuppose a lack of linkage between these functions – the literature of social 
psychologists and sociologists of emotion offers an extensive discussion of the extent 
and nature of such links
26
 – it is suggested here that Third Degree nudges are 
distinctive in so far as decision framing through emotional or any other form of 
influence (or combination of influences) is sufficient materially to obstruct reflection 
or the assessing, on reflection, of  the extent, nature and degree of the nudge. 
27
 
                                                 
23
 J. Blumenthal-Barby and H. Burroughs, ‘Seeking Better Health Care outcomes: The Ethics 
of Using the “Nudge”’ (2012) 12(2) Am. J. of Bioethics 1-10, 4. 
24
 ibid.  5. 
25
 An example of complete blocking would be the use of subliminal messaging – which 
imposes the nudge without the nudged individual’s awareness at the time or even afterwards. 
This would be unannounced, unpublicised subliminal messaging - though a government 
might openly declare that it has a policy of using subliminal messaging to control e.g. a health 
issue. Thaler and Sunstein argue that they endorse Rawls’ publicity principle as a limitation of 
nudging and that subliminal messaging is, accordingly, not acceptable because it lacks 
transparency, see: Thaler and Sunstein  2008, n 2 above, 243-246 and the discussion below. 
26
 See e.g. J. Storbeck and G. Clore, ‘On the interdependence of cognition and emotion’ 
(2007) 21 Cognition and Emotion 1212-1237; C. Izard, J. Kagan, and R. Zajonc (eds)  
Emotions, Cognition, and Behavior (Cambridge: CUP, 1984); T. Kemper (ed)  Research 
Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions (1990); T. Dalgleish and M. Power (eds), Handbook of 
Cognition and Emotion (Chichester: Wiley, 1999); T. Dalgleish and M. Power,  Cognition 
and Emotion (Hove: Psychology Press, 2008).  
27
 The difference between Second and Third degree nudges may thus be a difference of 
degree (no pun) rather than kind.  Second degree nudges may have an emotional dimension 
and they may also structure choices - the issue is whether the nudge materially impedes 
reflection  or an awareness, through reflection, of  the extent, nature and degree of the nudge. 
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Table 1:  Three Degrees of Nudge 
 Typical 
Characteristics 
Example Impact on 
autonomy 
First Degree Nudge 
 
Supply of simple 
information or a 
reminder with the 
aim of improving 
the target’s 
capacity to make an 
informed, rational 
and conscious 
choice. 
1. Health warning 
on cigarette pack. 
 
2. Reminder to fill 
in tax return. 
Respects the 
autonomy of 
decision-maker and 
enhances target’s 
rationality. 
Second Degree 
Nudge 
Behavioural or 
volitional 
limitations are 
exploited so as to 
bias decisions in a 
favoured direction. 
1. An opt-out organ 
donor regime is 
instituted. 
 
2. The office 
smoking zone is 
placed at a distance 
from the work area. 
 
 
The target could, 
on reflection, 
unearth the nature 
and effect of the 
nudge – but is 
unlikely to do so 
because of 
behavioural 
limitations and 
their tendency to 
exhibit an 
‘automatic’ 
response. 
Third Degree 
Nudge 
Framing strategies, 
emotional 
responses or covert 
techniques are used 
to influence 
decisions or shape 
preferences. 
1. A campaign 
promotes healthy 
eating with the 
slogan: ‘Don’t lose 
your looks, junk 
the junk food!’ 
 
2. Shocking images 
are used to control 
behaviour – as 
when photographs 
of lung cancer 
victims are used to 
control smoking.  
 
 
3. Unpublicised 
subliminal TV 
messages are used 
to encourage e.g. 
healthy eating or 
abstention from 
smoking. 
The target is 
influenced but 
reflection is 
obstructed or 
reflection 
materially fails to 
unpack the nature 
and extent of the 
decision or 
preference shaping.  
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The distinctions between these three degrees of nudge are important in assessing both 
the potential effectiveness and  the acceptability of nudging by different methods in 
different contexts. (This is the case in spite of our ability to conjure up instances at the 
borderlines of these categories.) Questions of acceptability will be considered below 
but, at this stage, it suffices to note that some degrees of nudge present much more 
serious representational and ethical issues than others. It follows that there are real 
dangers in adopting a loose conception of nudge. The most serious of these is that the 
most benignly uncontentious examples of nudge may be highlighted in debates and 
that this impedes critical reflection on the more controversial aspects and versions of 
the device.   
 
LIMITS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NUDGE 
Nudges are seen, by many politicians, to be an alternative to ‘command’ regulation28 
and it is appropriate, accordingly, to measure the nudge against the yardsticks 
commonly used in assessing regulatory strategies.
29
 Relevant issues are whether 
nudge produces properly targeted outcomes effectively and whether nudging serves 
representative and ethical values acceptably. 
       On the question  of effectiveness, the nudge has practical limitations – some of 
which are general and some of which apply especially to certain degrees of nudge. 
The first limitation to be noted is one that applies to all degrees of nudge and stems 
from nudge’s strategy of aiming to achieve results by focussing on the decision-
making of the individual.  It has been pointed out that such a focus may fail to address 
the causes of, or provide the solution to, a number of problems.
30
 Obesity, for 
example, may be seen by nudgers as the result of an accumulation of poor individual 
decisions (which can be improved by nudges) but this vision fails to take on board a 
host of biological, social and cultural causes of obesity. It has been argued, for 
instance, that the rise in obesity of recent years is not to be explained in terms of 
personal responsibility but in: ‘..a toxic combination of readily available cheap high 
energy food and drink, fewer opportunities for manual labour, an increase in car 
ownership, changing social norms concerning cooking and eating, and other features 
of the “obesogenic” environment.’31 If personal consumer decisions are only one 
element in the causation of obesity, nudges of those decisions are likely to prove of 
limited effect  in dealing with the essential problem. It is likely that obesity has to be 
                                                 
28
 See the evidence of the Minister for Government Policy, Oliver Letwin, to the House of 
Lords Select Committee, 2011, Q. 703, reported at para. 5.3. 
29
 On yardsticks for measuring regulation see generally R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. Lodge, 
Understanding Regulation (Second Edition) (Oxford: OUP, 2012) Chapter 3. 
30
 See: J-F Menard, ‘A “Nudge” for Public Health Ethics: Libertarian Paternalism as a 
Framework for Ethical Analysis of Public Health Interventions?’ (2010) 3 Public Health 
Ethics 229-238. 
31
 Evidence of Professor Thomas Baldwin, House of Lords Select Committee, 2011, para. 7.4. 
Other witnesses echoed this point: see the evidence of Dr Ian Campbell, Medical Director, 
Weight Concern (noted at para.7.8). See also: Foresight and BIS, Tackling Obesity: Future 
Choices (2007). For a discussion of behaviour change interventions and obesity see Appendix 
4 of House of Lords Select Committee, 2011. For similar arguments in relation to reducing 
car use see paras. 7.26 –7.48 and Appendix 5. 
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addressed with a combination of personal, normative, cultural and environmental 
measures (regulatory and non-regulatory) rather than left to nudging alone.
32
 
       Nudges that are aimed at individuals, moreover, will not always prove effective 
when the undesirable behaviour at issue is the product of collective processes and 
policies (for example where competing interests and pressures within an enterprise 
produce a corporate decision that harms the environment).
33
 Individually - targeted 
nudges are likely to impact on collectively-generated decisions only when the latter 
are sensitive to changes in the targeted individuals’ decisions (as where consumers are 
given information on corporate environmental records, this affects sales of the 
corporation’s products, and the corporation is sufficiently responsive to amend its 
environmental strategies as a result). It follows that, if many modern-day problems are 
organizationally generated, governmental inclinations to avoid the ‘nanny state’ by 
relying on ‘non-regulatory’ controls and individual responsibilities may hit the mark 
only under certain conditions. 
        A second limitation of effectiveness can be expected to vary across degrees of 
nudge. It is that individuals’ responses to nudges will differ across divergent 
institutional, social, economic and cultural contexts.
34
 A nudge to encourage recycling 
may not work as well in a disadvantaged community as in an affluent district.
35
 Nor 
will automatic enrolment into a retirement plan (with opt-out) operate to increase 
savings in the body of the population that does not earn enough to be able to put this 
money aside.
36
  
      Nudges, and different degrees of nudge, accordingly, can be expected to echo the 
tendency of traditional regulatory styles to vary in their effectiveness when targeted at 
different types of regulated concern and at people with different characteristics. Table 
2 below looks at four examples of nudges as applied to four different models of 
individual. It indicates whether the effect of a given nudge on the particular  target is 
likely to be high, medium or low.  The objective of the discussion here is not to give 
an exhaustive (and exhausting) account of variations in effectiveness across the huge 
number of possible ways to implement different nudge tools. The aim is to illustrate 
the kinds of variation in effectiveness that can be expected across not only degrees of 
nudge but across different nudge tools (even tools of the same degree). The four 
nudges set out in Table 2 are thus chosen to exemplify different degrees of nudge but 
also different nudge tools of the same degree.  
       The breakdown of individuals used in Table 2 is one familiar in the regulation 
literature
37
 and refers to those characterised respectively as: well-intentioned and high 
capacity; well-intentioned and low capacity; ill-intentioned and high capacity; ill-
                                                 
32
 House of Lords Select Committee, 2011, paras. 7.6 and  8.14 and evidence of Dr M. 
Hillsdon. 
33
 In contrast are instances in which the relevant decisions are made by individuals and those 
decisions are nudged. In such cases the nudging of individuals can  produce reactions on the 
part of corporations – as where citizens are nudged to smoke fewer cigarettes and corporate 
producers adapt their marketing strategies as a result. 
34
 See: e.g. L. Bovens, ‘Nudges  and Cultural Variance’ (2010) 23  Know.Tech. Pol. 483-486. 
35
 John, Smith and Stoker, n 14 above, 369. 
36
  Menard, n 30 above, 235. 
37
 See e.g. J. Black and R. Baldwin, ‘When Risk-Based Regulation Aims Low: A Strategic 
Framework’ (2012) 6 Regulation and Governance 131-148; R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. 
Lodge, Understanding Regulation 2
nd
 ed. (Oxford , 2012) pp. 230-231; R. Kagan and J. 
Scholz, ‘The Criminology of the Corporation’ in K. Hawkins and J. Thomas (eds), Enforcing 
Regulation (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1984). 
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intentioned and low capacity. ‘Intentioned’ here refers to the extent to  which the 
targeted person espouses the same objective as the nudger. Thus, a well-intentioned 
target will be interested in, and strongly disposed in favour of the behaviour that the 
nudger sees as virtuous. Ill-intentioned targets will not espouse such objectives and 
may even be actively opposed to behaving in the manner that the nudger sees as 
virtuous. 
      ‘Capacity’ refers to the ability of that person to gain, receive absorb and act on 
information. A high capacity individual will thus be able to receive messages (even 
complex ones) effectively and will be able to adjust his or her behaviour in response 
to such messages. Whether such an individual will be inclined to adjust their 
behaviour in accordance with the message received will, of course, depend on their 
intention rather than capacity. High capacity individuals who are not well-intentioned 
and not inclined to act in accordance with a message will be very able to adjust their 
behaviour so as to reject that message and act in ways that are inconsistent with it. 
Such individuals will possess a high ability to ‘unearth’ nudges, such as defaults, and 
to resist these. Low capacity individuals will struggle to absorb and act on even 
simple messages, even when disposed so to act. Low capacity individuals who are ill-
intentioned, will, moreover, have very limited ability to adjust their behaviour so as to 
reject messages that they disagree with and to act in ways that are inconsistent with 
such messages. They will, in turn, possess poor abilities to ‘unearth’ nudges such as 
defaults, and resist these. 
 
Table 2: The Anticipated Impact of Nudges on Different Targets. 
 
 Information 
Mechanism:  
Simple 
nutritional 
information is 
provided on 
food packaging. 
 
(A First Degree 
Nudge) 
Default: 
An opt-out  
regime is 
adopted for 
organ 
donation. 
 
 
(A Second 
Degree Nudge) 
Design: 
The smoking 
zone is placed at 
a distance from 
the office work 
area. 
 
 
(A Second 
Degree Nudge) 
Warning: 
Shocking  
photographs of 
lung cancer 
victims are used 
to control 
smoking. 
 
(A Third Degree 
Nudge) 
Well-intentioned and 
High Capacity 
High High High High 
Well-intentioned and 
Low Capacity 
Low High High High 
Ill-intentioned and 
Low Capacity 
Low High Medium High 
Ill-intentioned and 
High Capacity 
Low Low Low Medium 
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Empirical evidence on the above indications is, as yet, thin on the ground (a matter to 
be returned to below) but, if there is some truth in the estimations summarised in 
Table 2, this offers at least three relevant messages for potential nudgers. First, 
different degrees of nudge, different nudge tools, and different ways of implementing 
given tools can be expected to bring different effectiveness profiles. Thus, the 
successful use of a First Degree nudge, such as the provision of simple information, 
can be expected to be far more dependent on the capacity of the target than a Second 
Degree nudge such as a design, or a default approach or a Third Degree nudge such as 
a shock image. The First Degree nudge, after all, depends on stimulating high quality 
conscious decision-making. With targets of low capacity it can be expected that 
Second and Third Degree nudges will bring special potential – though it can also be 
seen in Table 2 that even across different tools of the same degree there may be 
variations in effectiveness with regard to low capacity targets. 
       A second message is that even a First Degree nudge, such as simple information 
supply, may prove effective only with a small minority of targets. Third, it can be 
anticipated that targets who are ill-intentioned and high capacity will tend to be 
difficult to nudge with a high degree of effectiveness whatever degree or tool of 
nudge is employed. 
38
 
       At this point it should be emphasised that the above discussion does not constitute 
an argument against nudging per se but it offers a caution that the respective 
limitations of different degrees, tools and modes of implementing nudges need to be 
borne in mind if the nudge approach is to be deployed astutely. 
       A further limitation on the effectiveness of nudging is presented by the possibility 
of the counter-nudge, and here there is a contrast with traditional command 
approaches. If legislators ban the sale of alcohol above a certain strength, they deal 
with the issue definitively. If they rely on a nudge to control this activity (e.g. 
imposing a requirement that a person registers before purchasing such alcohol) there 
is the potential for interested parties to ‘counter-nudge’.39 Thus, the supermarkets 
have the chance to respond by stacking high strength alcohol next to the till or by 
advertising it more intensively. The marketing and advertising sectors of the private 
sector may, indeed, prove formidable opponents for the governmental players of the 
nudge game. It is unlikely, for instance, that nudgers who seek to control obesity will 
ever match the power to influence that is provided by the promotional budgets of the 
fast food industry. This is a point that applies across the range of nudge categories, 
though the higher the degree of nudge used, the more severe will be the response 
needed to contest this. 
     When nudging operates over time, there is another issue that goes to the 
effectiveness of the device. Nudges that are genuinely paternalistic (Second and Third 
Degree nudges) may undermine relationships that are based on trust when the practice 
                                                 
38
 Table 2 suggests that, even with the default and design strategies that are discussed, targets 
of ill-intention and high capacity  may use their cognitive resources to unmask the nudges and 
circumvent these. See also the discussion of the limits of regulating internet users’ behaviour 
through ‘code’ in A. Murray, ‘Internet Regulation’ in D. Levi-Faur (ed),  Handbook on the 
Politics of Regulation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011). 
39
 It is conceded that the targets of legislation may respond by strategies such as creative 
compliance or breaching the law – what they cannot do is counter-legislate. 
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of nudging is uncovered. Thus, in the field of medicine it has been warned that nudges 
can be seen as scare tactics by patients and that this can alienate them from their 
doctors. The use of information selectively or emotively can thus act to the detriment 
of treatment in the longer term.
40
 Similarly, it has been argued that nudges may lead 
patients to see their physicians as operating a ‘policing’ function and that this may 
lead the former to withhold important medical information from those who treat 
them.
41
 The problem will be all the greater if the nudger is seen to be manipulating the 
truth in ‘constructing a narrative’ for the purposes of nudging – as, for example, 
through an inaccurate or ‘aspirational’ representation of general practice  such as: 
‘Nearly all patients consent to this procedure.’  
      As for nudge’s effectiveness as a device for avoiding need for legal rules, this is 
easy to exaggerate. Governments can nudge individuals directly but they will often 
use businesses as their nudging agents for all degrees of nudge. This occurs, for 
example, when retailers are legally required to provide consumers with certain 
messages or items of information. In such regimes it is true that consumers do escape 
from the clutches of command and control laws but this is by no means the case for 
the affected businesses. 
      As far as producing properly targeted outcomes effectively, it cannot be assumed 
that nudges (of whatever degree) are any less prone to the triggering of unintended 
consequences than other forms of regulatory or non-regulatory intervention.
42
 Thus, it 
has been pointed out that consumers may override intuitive responses or react 
perversely to nudges.
43
 Food that is labelled as healthy may lead to excessive 
consumption.
44
 Positive information on low levels of a certain unhealthy ingredient 
may blind the consumer to high quantities of another unhealthy component,
45
 and a 
positive message about one aspect of a food may induce underestimations of other, 
harmful, qualities.
46
 
     A further targeting challenge  arises when opinions differ or develop on what such 
outcomes involve – and these challenges may differ across degrees of nudge. First 
Degree nudges  encourage conscious deliberation on the ‘think’ model and  operate 
with a mechanism that can cope with differences and changes in perceptions 
regarding desired outcomes (e.g. new ideas about the right balance between alcohol 
and carbohydrate consumption). The danger with nudges that influence automatic 
responses (Second and Third Degree nudges) is that it is the paternalistic nudger that 
defines desired outcomes and this may lead to a false sense of security concerning the 
desirability of those outcomes.
47
 The problem is that, even if the nudger’s views on 
                                                 
40
 Blumenthal-Barby and H. Burroughs, n 22 above, 5. 
41
 ibid. 2. 
42
 An assumption apparently made by the Minister, Oliver Letwin MP, in giving evidence  – 
see House of Lords Select Committee, 2011, para. 5.7.  
43
 See O. Amir and O. Lobel, ‘Stumble, Predict, Nudge’ (2008) 108  Col. L. Rev. 2098-2137, 
2116. Ill-intentioned, high capacity targets may be especially prone to perverse reaction. 
44
 House of Lords Select Committee, 2011, para. 7.11. 
45
 An investigation by The Daily Telegraph in March 2014 revealed that foods promoted as 
‘low fat’ and ‘low calorie’ often had more harmful effects on heath than their full fat 
equivalents. The campaign group Action on Sugar protested that manufacturers were 
‘misleading’  shoppers. See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/10668189/Low-
fat-foods-stuffed-with-harmful-levels-of-sugar.html  (Last visited 8.3.14). 
46
 T.  Marteau et al ‘Judging Nudging: Can Nudging Improve Population Health?’ (2011) 342 
BMJ 263, 264. 
47
 John, Smith and Stoker, (2009), n 14 above, 368. 
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outcomes coincided initially with those of the consumers or citizens being protected, 
the two strands of thought may, over time, diverge because such nudges are based on 
paternalism rather than the fostering of an ongoing dialogue about objectives. In such 
cases, nudge may produce results other that those that the nudged parties would have 
sought. 
       Finally, it should be noted that numbers of commentators have stressed that there 
has emerged very little concrete evidence on the effectiveness of nudge strategies. To 
an extent this may stem from the paucity of studies that deal with the performance of 
nudges.
48
 The House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, indeed, stated in 
2011 that it had been provided with no examples of significant change in the 
behaviour of a population having been achieved by non-regulatory measures alone.
49
 
Its report concluded that non-regulatory measures were often not likely to be effective 
when used in isolation and that, usually, a range of policy tools, of both kinds, would 
be need to bring about change effectively.
50
 The Committee stressed that more 
rigorous steps should be taken within government to ensure the effective evaluation of 
behaviour change interventions.
51
 
 
REPRESENTATIONAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 
Nudge, with its philosophy of ‘libertarian paternalism,’ gives rise to a number of 
representational and ethical concerns. A first of these is that many decisions to nudge 
lack the transparency and public consideration that are normally associated with 
command regimes.
52
 If a government issues a law that prohibits citizens from 
smoking in public places, this is a mode of control that is open, discussed, and 
implemented after representative processes have been followed.
53
 If nudging is used, 
the process used to effect a nudge may be far more secretive—the nudge, for instance, 
may flow from an administrator’s decision on the design of a public building: a 
decision not subjected to advanced disclosure or debate. As Luc Bovens has said, 
nudges ‘typically work better in the dark’.54 This may be seen as relatively 
unobjectionable in the case of First Degree nudges, since these contribute positively 
                                                 
48
 Marteau,  n 26 above, 264. 
49
 House of Lords Select Committee, 2011, para. 5.6. 
50
 ibid. paras. 5.13; 8.14.  
51
 ibid. Chapter 6 and  paras. 8.21-8.22. Others have suggested that, given the variety of 
nudges, such work should deal with a series of issues: What works?  For whom?  In what 
circumstances?  For how long? How effective would nudges be compared to other 
interventions? See e.g. Marteau and colleagues at Marteau (2011) n 26 above , 264. 
52
 See R. Brownsword, ‘Code, Control, and Choice: Why East is East and West is West’ 
(2005) 25 Legal Studies 1-21 who contrasts the transparency of ‘command’ (‘East coast’) and 
‘design’ (‘West coast’) controls. See similarly:  L. Tien, ‘Architectural Regulation and the 
Evolution of Social Norms’ (2004) 9 International Journal of Communications Law and 
Policy 1. On control through ‘design’, ‘code’ or architecture’ more generally see L. Lessig, 
Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999); A. Murray and C. 
Scott, ‘Controlling the New Media: Hybrid Responses to New Forms of Power’ (2002) 65 
MLR 491. 
53
 The transparency of ‘command’ approaches should not, however, be exaggerated – many 
commands are promulgated through delegated legislation and other varieties of soft law. See 
generally R. Baldwin Rules and Government (Oxford: OUP, 1995). It is arguable, 
nevertheless, that nudges can be instituted by methods that are far less transparent than even 
the processes used to introduce soft-laws. 
54
 See Bovens,  n 14 above, 3 ( referring to nudges that would be Second Degree nudges in 
the framework proposed by this article). 
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to conscious individual decision-making, but a lack of transparency regarding Second 
and Third Degree nudges would be far more contentious. 
      It is true that, where legislation is used to institute the nudge – as when a new law 
demands that supermarkets place fruit next to the till – there will be the normal public 
debate that attaches to the legislative process. Many nudges, however, will not 
demand legislation and may be triggered administratively, as may, for instance: 
informational nudges, administrative default rules, publicity campaigns, alterations in 
the physical environment and the messaging of social norms. 
    The proponents of nudge might protest that nudges of all degrees can be disclosed. 
Thaler and Sunstein, indeed, state that they object to nudging by subliminal 
messaging because they endorse Rawls’ publicity principle as a limitation of nudging 
and  subliminal messaging is, accordingly, not acceptable because it lacks 
transparency.
55
  The problem, however, is that, although it is possible for a 
government to state openly that it is using Second or Third Degree nudges in an area, 
there are reasons to be pessimistic about the prospects of this ocurring so that this 
enhances rational decision-making or transparency. First, there is the Bovens point, 
noted above – if the students are told that the cafeteria food is arranged in order to 
push them towards a healthy diet, this is likely to undermine the effectiveness of the 
nudge.
56
 Second, a general disclosure about nudging (‘We have designed this working 
environment to help you make healthy decisions’) may prove unhelpful in rendering 
the nudge’s existence or nature evident at the time when a particular decision is 
taken.
57
 After all, the critics would say, nudges (of the Second Degree and Third 
Degree) are applied on occasions that allow the exploitation of an individual’s 
weaknesses of willpower, emotion and rationality  and this is not a context likely to 
encourage advertence to the fact or extent  of a nudge. Showing the drowning bather a 
flipchart about learning to swim may be poor timing. 
        In further defence of the nudge it might be suggested that there is little need for 
debate when all the nudger is doing is making  targets’ lives ‘longer, healthier and 
better’ and trying to ‘influence choices in a way that will make choosers better off as 
judged by themselves’.58  The nudge, on this view, conduces to the decision that the 
target would have arrived at had he or she paid full attention and possessed complete 
information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and complete self-control.
59
 The limitation 
of this argument is that Second and Third Degree nudges do not involve seeking to 
identify the conception of welfare that the target would espouse.
60
 In contrast, when 
nudging goes beyond the supply of simple information, or reminders, at the ‘First 
Degree’ level (which can be said to enhance the target’s conscious decision-making) 
what is involved is the nudger acting in a semi-covert or covert manner to further the 
nudger’s own conception of  the target’s welfare – which may involve re-shaping the 
target’s idea of their own welfare.  
                                                 
55
 Thaler and Sunstein  2008, n 2 above, 243-246. 
56
 See Bovens, n 14 above, 3-4. 
57
 Brownsword, n 52  above, 14 - 17 makes the additional point that ‘design’ approaches can 
‘embed’ solutions so that those affected in the future have little consciousness of prior design 
decisions and no input into the ways in which they are controlled. 
58
 See Thaler and Sunstein 2008, n 2 above, 5. 
59
 ibid.6. 
60
 On the argument that targets’ desires and preferences tend to be shaped inevitably and that 
this justifies nudging because there is usually no autonomy to be interfered with, see the text 
following footnote 72 below. 
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      This would not be such a great worry if there was some objective welfare to be 
pursued without the possibility of contention. Such a scenario, however, may be less 
realisable than first appears. Thus, a nudge might aim to further ‘better health’ on the 
assumption that this is uncontroversial but, as Gregory Mitchell has pointed out: 
‘Many may agree in the abstract that better health is preferable to worse health, but 
when the choice is framed as enjoying life-shortening but intensely pleasurable vices 
during one’s college days versus abstaining during college to gain a couple of extra 
boring years at an advanced age, then better health may not look quite as good.’61 
    The danger is that the enthusiastic proponents of nudging
62
 will be slow to 
anticipate conceptions of welfare or preferences that they see as non-sensible or which 
stem from perspectives that they do not share. They may, moreover, fail to anticipate 
that nudges may prove contentious not merely because they seek to further contested 
visions of welfare but because the costs of furthering those visions, or the 
distributions of such costs, or the costs of opting out of nudges may be controversial 
matters in themselves. A further concern of nudge’s critics may be that the banner of 
libertarian paternalism may be used as a cover for the pursuit of social objectives 
(such as lowering hospital’s administration costs) rather than the welfares of the 
nudged individuals.
63
 
       Proponents of nudge, of course, have a fall-back defence against the accusations 
of illiberalism that apply to Second and Third Degree nudges: they stress, as noted, 
that a nudge should be ‘easy and cheap to avoid’.64 A difficulty here is that there is an 
inherent tension in the nudging argument that goes to the feasibility of opt-out. The 
nudge has power in so far as it impacts on the decision-maker of limited cognitive 
capacity, information and self-control. Those very limitations, however, mean that the 
target is unlikely to be well-placed to exercise the opt-out in cases of Second Degree 
nudges. With Third Degree nudges, the position is worse because the target will be     
‘blocked’ from resorting to the opt-out.  When a nudge is used to shape the target’s 
preferences (as when a vivid example of a harm is used to trigger aversion) the opt-
out is taken out of play.  As Mitchell argues, more generally: ‘If choice is as ‘sticky’as 
Thaler and Sunstein claim, then people who lack the means to determine their true 
preferences in a given setting cannot make any real use of the opt-out provision and 
will simply stick with the default set by the libertarian paternalist. For these people 
libertarian paternalism is just paternalism.’65  For such reasons, nudges have been said 
to be, on their face, as threatening to liberty, broadly understood, as is overt 
coercion.
66
 
       The opt-out defence is also vulnerable to the criticism that it not only assumes a 
level of competence, rationality and volitional control that contradicts the 
underpinning assumptions of behavioural economics, but it understates the extent to 
which opt-outs discriminate against parties who are less able to exercise them. An 
opt-out that is a mere mouse click is easy enough to most persons but not to the 
person who does not possess a computer. An organ donation opt-out that is recorded 
                                                 
61
 See G. Mitchell, ‘Libertarian Paternalism is an Oxymoron’ (2005) 99 N. Western U. Law 
Review 1245, 1268. 
62
 On nudge as ‘never knowingly undersold’ see R. Baldwin, The New Scholarship: 
Celebrating the ‘I’ in Ideas   LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 5/2012. 
Available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2012-05_Baldwin.pdf 
63
 Blumenthal-Barby and H. Burroughs, n 22 above, 4. 
64
 Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, n 2 above, 6. 
65
 Mitchell, n 61 above, 1254. 
66
 See Hausman and  Welch,  n 14 above, 130. 
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on a driving licence would not be very accessible to a committed cyclist, and some 
smokers with mobility issues may not think that the 100 metre journey to the office 
smoking zone is an easy opt out from the design nudge of the departmental architect. 
In the medical field, it has been pointed out that written opt-outs are not that useful to 
linguistic minorities, and illiterate persons.
67
  
    A further concern is that, even if exercising one opt-out may be relatively easy, 
cumulations of nudges (of the Second and Third Degree
68
) produce an aggregate 
burden that will weigh down persons who would seek to negotiate their own way 
through everyday decision shapings so as to pursue their own aims and objectives. In 
a world of nudge, the worry is, the individual fights an unending battle to construct 
his or her own preferences and to play the opt-out game in order to further those 
preferences. Their autonomy, they may feel, dies the death of a thousand nudges.  
    To construct a simple example, let us suppose that supermarkets agree with the 
Government that on-line shoppers will be presented with default purchases that 
encourage healthy lifestyles and that the retailers in question nudge with enthusiasm. 
The shopper may avoid the default acqusition of fresh apples on supermarket X’s 
website by a mouse click but then has to click to avoid purchasing broccoli, cod liver 
oil tablets, aspirins, glucosamate pills and thirty other products. This arrangement 
raises a number of issues. In the first instance, there is a question of how a nudge is 
conceived for the purposes of opt-out. The ‘apples nudge’ is avoided by a single click 
but the ‘healthy lifestyle’ nudge requires over thirty clicks to neutralise – which is 
likely to prove wearisome if the process afflicts all on-line shopping episodes. On one 
view, each nudge is avoided easily and complies with Thaler and Sunstein’s 
conditions for nudging. On another view, the cumulative burden of opting out of this 
package of defaults is unacceptable.  
      A further worry about Second and Third degree nudging is prompted by the 
example under consideration. Where a Government uses agents, such as retailers, to 
implement such nudges this creates a specific set of problems.
69
 Not only are there 
issues of consistency of interpretation, transparency and accountability, but there are 
challenges to the opt-out. Where different supermarkets implement the nudge in 
different ways, the consumer has to pay special attention to each opt-out because 
some nudgers’ approaches and some ‘nudged’ products will be more questionable 
than others. (Will the dosages of glucosamine sulphate sold by supermarket Y’s 
default actually bring benefits that justify the costs? Is the cardiac case for a daily 
aspirin made out?) For consumers, the effort required to address these issues only 
adds to the burdens of opting-out. They may resent having to negotiate their way 
through a brand-specific lifestyle training session every time they order some 
groceries. 
      Nor can it be assumed that the consequences of a failure to opt-out will be 
uniform across populations. Thus, for example, presumed consents for HIV testing 
may prove especially threatening to individuals who are liable to a range of 
particularly negative consequences if they fail the test – such as domestic violence or 
                                                 
67
 See M-A Jacob, ‘Another look at the presumed-versus-informed consent dichotomy in 
post-mortem organ procurement.’ (2006) 20(6) Bioethics 293-300. 
68
 This point applies to a lesser extent  to First Degree nudges  since even warnings and 
simple items of information  may cumulate to a mass that is seen as oppressive by the targets. 
69
 Agency issues, of course, add to dangers that nudges will cause unintended consequences 
and this further undermines the argument that nudges are more easily targeted than 
commands. 
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job loss.
70
 Where there are such divergencies of consequence, and these are not taken 
on board, the danger is that  calculations about the balance between the value of the 
nudge and the costs of opt-out will produce  nudges that discriminate against 
vulnerable parties. 
      A broader issue of fairness also arises with Second and Third Degree nudges – 
they impose costs on sensible persons in order to enhance the welfare of others who 
behave irresponsibly. To take an example, let us suppose that a government is 
concerned to control excessive alcohol consumption. It passes a law to require all 
retail outlets to place alcohol in locked cabinets, out of sight of shoppers. The (Second 
Degree) nudge derives from the conscious effort that is required in order for the 
shopper to obtain the alcohol (by specific request for service) and from the 
neutralising of any sales-enhancing layouts by the retailer. Leaving aside whether this 
nudge would limit consumption effectively, it can be noted that the nudge involves an 
inconvenience for, amongst others, the 93 per cent of the mature male, and 96 per cent 
of the mature female, population who can limit their consumption to below ‘harmful’ 
levels when left to their own devices and exposed to the nudges of retailers, brewers 
and distillers. 
71
 There is, accordingly an issue of distributional justice here and some 
parties will object to this redistribution from the rational/responsible to the 
irrational/irresponsible.
72
  
       A second defence of nudging is of special relevance to Second and Third Degree 
nudges and argues that there is always a nudge from some direction so that peoples’ 
preferences and choices are inevitably structured and influenced (either intentionally 
or unintentionally) and that, therefore, it is best that the nudge is applied in a welfare 
enhancing direction.
73
 Thus, it might be contended that, uncontrolled, the astute 
supermarket would be likely to place a profit maximising product next to the till, or 
the less organised supermarket might rotate products randomly on the till display. Far 
better, it would be said, if the supermarket was required to place the fruit next to the 
till in order to nudge consumers towards healthy options.  
     A first objection to this defence is that it is wrong to assume that all preferences 
and choices are framed or presented in unacceptable ways. In many decision-making 
contexts, the decision-maker is capable of identifying his or her own preferences and 
is faced with information that he or she is quite capable of processing and acting on so 
as to serve their interests and preferences.
74
 The real issue, on this view, is not 
whether the decision is shaped but whether the pre-nudge decision-making context is 
seen as manageable and acceptable. Even when nudged by, say, a retailer, it is routine 
for the consumer to be content with the rationality and level of autonomy that he or 
she exercises. The decision environment may not be ‘true’ but it is seen as acceptably 
manageable. (The consumer exercises his or her autonomy here in accepting that they, 
rather than someone else, will deal with the decision-making context in all its 
imperfections.) Thus, many vegetable purchasers know what they are looking for and 
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 C. Hanssens, ‘Legal and Ethical Implications of Opt-out HIV Testing.’ (2007) 45 Clinical 
Infectious Diseases  232-239.   
71
 In the 45-64 year old grouping, the evidence is that 7% of men and   of 4% of women drink 
to a ‘harmful’ level (over 50 units per week for men and 35 units for women) – see Institute 
of Alcohol Studies, Alcohol Consumption Factsheet  (IAS, 2013)  11. 
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 See Mitchell, n 61 above, 1270. 
73
 First Degree nudges arguably do not demand that this defence is made since they enhance 
conscious  decision-making. 
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 See the concession of this point at Thaler and Sunstein 2008, n 2 above, 10. 
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expect the greengrocer to place the best produce at the front of the stall and to serve 
from the back.  
      The advocates of Second and Third degree nudging, it can thus be argued, 
interfere with the autonomy of individuals too readily and nudge theory can be said 
not yet to have produced either a way of separating out unacceptable from acceptable 
choice structurings or of identifying those circumstances in which decision-making 
autonomy is so prejudiced by shaping influences that this justifies intervention 
through another nudge. 
75
 
        A closely related line of nudge-defence should be considered at this point. This 
contends that it is wrong to object to Second and Third degree nudging as an attack on 
individual autonomy because such an objection presupposes an idealised version of 
‘true’ autonomy that is based on an assumption of fully-informed, rational and 
unshaped decision-making. The reality, the nudge proponents argue, is that the 
‘autonomous choices’ that individuals generally make are usually shaped by a host of 
features of the consumption environment, they are often the products of cognitive and 
volitional limitations, and, as a result, there is rarely an exercise of unimpaired and 
‘true’ autonomy. The counter to this argument, however, is not merely the point just 
made (that some choice framings are seen as acceptable) it is also that the pro-nudgers 
are too quick to portray some preferences as irrationalities. Thus, some of the ‘biases 
and blunders’ that Thaler and Sunstein cite as causes of poor decisions76 can be said 
to be preferences that deserve to be respected rather than cognitive or volitional 
failings that need to be reacted to with a nudge. Loss aversion, for instance, is said by 
Thaler and Sunstein to be a ‘matter that people can get pretty emotional about’77 so 
that they value not losing things far more than gaining the same things. This produces 
inertia and leads to decisions that do not serve peoples’ own interests.78 It is a 
‘fallibility’ that the two authors suggest can be corrected with a nudge. The nudge-
sceptics, however, would argue that this is not a case of impaired autonomy but of a 
choice that the nudgers disagree with. The sceptics might add that, if a person has a 
preference for the status quo, it is their life, their inertia, their choice, not that of the 
nudger. 
       To return to reservations about the ‘nudges are unavoidable’ argument, a second 
objection  is that, even if the premise is assumed to be correct, the conclusion does not 
follow. Thus, it can be argued that the supermarkets’ propensities to nudge consumers 
in unhealthy directions (leading, for example, to the consumption of excessive 
amounts of sugar) do not necessarily demand that the state responds to such nudging 
with another nudge (or, indeed, with a nudge of a Second or Third degree as opposed 
to a First Degree). In many contexts, it could be argued, it would be more effective, 
more accountable and more transparent to react with, say, a command approach and 
revise the laws on food ingredients (e.g. to limit the maximum concentrations of sugar 
that are deemed safe to sell).  
   There is, indeed, an argument that to respond to nudges with state-applied counter 
nudges of the Second and Third Degree is exactly the wrong policy in those cases 
where it causes citizens and consumers to be exposed to layers of competing nudges. 
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This accumulating of nudges, it could be argued, multiplies the undermining of 
autonomy that even single (Second or Third Degree) nudges involve. 
      Here we see that a supposed argument for nudging may have force in relation to 
one degree of nudge but not to others. Thus, when Thaler and Sunstein argue that 
‘rare, difficult choices are good candidates for nudge’79 it may be conceded that some 
positive potential is offered by a First Degree nudge that is designed to enhance 
conscious decision-making by rendering complex data more manageable. It will be far 
less readily acknowledged that there is case for a Second or Third Degree nudge 
since, as just argued, this is likely to conduce to a cumulative undermining of 
autonomy. 
       A further concern about Second and Third Degree nudges relates to their longer-
term and extensive use. It is that such responses do not seek to improve rational, 
informed decision-making but serve to reduce the citizen’s voice in his or her destiny. 
Used over time and numbers of issues, the effects of such accumulations of nudging 
may be to produce control regimes that are defeatist about the capacities of 
individuals to become more responsible and deliberative. The worry is that 
proliferations of nudges produce citizens with ‘choice structuring fatigue’ and they 
positively discourage the kinds of learning, responsible and thinking behaviour that 
most governments espouse. Any short term positive gains from nudge may be 
outweighed in time as people both  ‘zone out’ from nudges and succumb to an 
‘infantilisation effect’ by assuming less responsibility for their own welfare.80 
     It can be argued, furthermore, that many citizens may be unhappy about state 
Second and Third Degree nudges in a way that they are not about commercial or other 
decision-shaping pushes.
81
 There may be a number of reasons for this. They may see 
commercial nudges, such as advertising campaigns and store designs, as consistent 
and predictable facts of life that they are comfortable in dealing with. They accept that 
salespersons will puff their products and engage in like behaviour but they may even 
enjoy negotiating their way through the market, provided that no lies are told. In 
contrast, they may see state nudges of the Second and Third Degree to be far more 
covert, unknowable and threatening than the expected strategies of marketing and 
sales. The public, moreover,  may fear the scale of organized governmental nudging 
much more than they would a random collection of market-driven nudges.   
     Expectations may also differentiate between nudges from private and public 
sources. Citizens and consumers may anticipate and accept that the private sector will 
behave in a profit-enhancing manner and use methods to further such ends that are not 
wholly transparent. The public, though, may expect better things from the 
governments that they have elected and entrusted with vast sets of powers. There is 
likely to be a demand that, in using these powers to control and shape peoples’ lives 
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and decisions, ministers, officials and regulators use methods that are properly open 
and accountable rather than covert and undermining of citizen autonomy. Nudges of 
the second and third degree are liable to be seen as exploitative of citizens’ 
weaknesses and as ‘a form of disrespectful social control’.82 The public, on some 
issues, will think: ‘If the government sees the need to control this issue, they should 
tell us this and have the courage to seek parliamentary approval for new legislation 
rather than operate with some sly nudge.’ 
     A third defence of nudging would contend that the allegedly negative features of 
nudge have to weighed against the behavioural and welfare gains that can be 
achieved. This is a defence that is  canvassed by some commentators but it is not one 
that Thaler and Sunstein rely on heavily, since they take it that the heat is taken out of 
this issue by their stipulation that opt-outs should be easy. 
83
 
     To balance the costs and benefits of nudging is, however, just one of a number of 
ways of dealing with the case for nudging and two further approaches can be noted. A 
second considers the proportionality of the nudge and a third looks to the  public 
acceptability of the nudge.  
     The essence of the cost-benefit approach is a comparison of the gains in health or 
other aspects of welfare to be anticipated from a nudge and the losses to autonomy 
and quality of life that a nudge may produce in the short or longer term.
84
 A 
‘proportionality’ approach differs from a cost-benefit view in emphasising non- 
quantitative and ethical factors. It adverts to such matters as the scale of the problem 
to be addressed, the evidence that the nudge will be effective, and the representative 
and moral considerations that are relevant. These latter will include such matters as 
intrusiveness, restriction of freedom, quality of choices made, and transparency.
85
 
     A public acceptability approach asks whether the use of a nudge, in a given 
context, is sanctioned by popular approval or ‘public permission’.86 For its part, the 
House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee was not convinced by this 
latter approach and cautioned that: the public tended to resist change and its approval 
might only be evident sometime after a nudge had been used. Popular approval tended 
to vacillate over time, and the individuals making up the public might possess 
distorted or misguided views on these matters for a number of reasons familiar to 
behavioural economists.
87
 
      In the following section the approach that is adopted in assessing nudge comes 
closest to the proportionality version. It draws out the messages from the above 
discussion in seeking to identify the circumstances under which governments can be 
expected to use nudge in a manner that is positive.  
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THE CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE AND ACCEPTABLE USE 
It is clear that First, Second and Third Degree nudges raise very different issues and 
that this has to be borne in mind in looking at any potential nudge. Not only that but 
different nudging tools have divergent potential in different contexts. This section 
will, accordingly seek to deal with the different degrees of nudge  and the different 
tools for nudging whenever these present variations of challenge. 
     Can the conditions for effective use of nudge be stated? A first message from the 
above discussion is that nudge cannot be expected to produce results effectively, as a 
sole strategy for intervention, where the causes of the identified mischief go beyond 
individual choice and relate to such matters as economic and cultural environments. 
Secondly, it is a condition for effective use of nudge that the targets of the given 
nudge are liable to be affected by the particular nudge tool employed. Table 2 
indicated how dramatically reactions to nudges can be expected to vary across not 
only targets with different characteristics, but also tool types, degrees of nudge, and 
modes of implementing nudge tools. 
     Third, unanticipated side effects and unintended consequences have to be 
anticipated as much with nudges as command rules, taxation mechanisms or other 
intervention strategies. Similarly, it is necessary to anticipate the effectiveness 
implications of any likely counter-nudges that may be forthcoming. 
     Fourth, mechanisms have to be adopted to deal with the danger that nudging 
objectives lose contact with the relevant expectations of the public or the government. 
This may demand that deliberative procedures are operated in parallel with nudges 
and that feedback loops are established so as to inform and update the nudgers. 
     Fifth, the cumulative and long-term effects of nudging have to be taken on board in 
order to avoid the tendency of short term gains to be achieved and the expense of 
longer term, and greater, costs. Such effects include potential diminutions in trust, 
nudge fatigue, and infantilisation. 
     Finally, a condition for the effective use of nudges across government is that 
governments  institute, on a broad basis, more studies that are designed to evaluate 
behaviour change interventions. 
     Turning to the conditions for using a proposed nudge  in an acceptable manner, the 
central challenge is to satisfy expectations on representational and ethical fronts. 
Regarding such matters, First Degree nudges can be separated out as far less 
problematic than Second or Third Degree nudges. With a First Degree nudge, the 
autonomy of the citizen is respected and conscious decision-making is enhanced. Few 
representational or ethical problems can be expected to arise provided that the simple 
information (or reminder) given is accurate. Some attention, nevertheless, may have 
to be paid to the need to justify the decision to provide this piece of information or 
this reminder rather than another. 
     Second Degree and Third Degree nudges are a different matter because they 
detract from the autonomy of individuals to different extents. Acceptable use of nudge 
demands that the nudgers have satisfactory responses to the following concerns. The 
lack of public debate and accountability involved in many nudges. The imposition of 
the nudger’s conception of welfare rather than the target’s. The limitations of opt-
outs, their variations in availability and practicality and their sometimes 
discriminatory effects. A further concern that may call for a response is the fairness of 
imposing on the autonomy and convenience of more sensible citizens in order to 
assist those who are less responsible. With Third Degree nudges, the 
emotional/psychological blocking of the opt-out is a special worry as is the removal 
of opt-out through the re-shaping of preferences. 
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      Justification may also be needed for choosing the nudge as a response to a 
problem (even a decision-framing problem) rather than a command, economic 
incentive or other intervention. The notion that nudges are inevitable, and that this 
justifies governmental nudging, seems flawed on a number of counts. 
      How then, might one go about judging whether a proposed nudge would have 
value in a given context? A starting point would be clarity on the character of the 
mooted nudge.  Is it a First, Second, or Third Degree example? Such characterisation 
immediately throws challenges into relief.  Next, it is essential to demonstrate with an 
evidentially secure case that the outcomes of the proposed nudge are likely to be 
secured effectively and that nudging will realise these in a superior fashion to more 
traditional regulatory interventions.  
     On representational and ethical matters, one potential response to worries is to 
show that processes ancillary to the nudge will ameliorate problems. Thus, references 
can be made to transparency exercises such as disclosures of nudges or consultation 
and feedback procedures. It can be expected, however, that, as noted above, general 
strategies of disclosure will be seen as doing little to change the semi-covert nature of  
many Second Degree nudges, and that disclosures relating to Third Degree nudges are 
as likely to provoke protest as to reassure potentially targeted citizens. 
      A second response is to demonstrate that there are no representational and ethical 
losses resulting from nudging since, in the given context, there is evidence that 
individual autonomy is already so badly compromised that a nudge produces a 
welfare enhancing result without further detracting from decision-making autonomy. 
A   difficulty here is to show that the alleged imperfections of autonomy that are cited 
are not, in fact, merely manifestations of preference that the nudger lacks sympathy 
with. A further problem with the ‘compromised autonomy’ argument lies in 
contending that Second and Third Degree nudges will enhance decision-making rather 
than simply place a further hurdle in the way of conscious decision-making. 
      Overall, the case has to be made that the gains from nudging will outweigh the 
representational and ethical costs and worries noted above. The difficulty is that 
Second and Third Degree nudges will routinely involve representational and ethical 
costs that are both difficult to quantify and liable to be contested. A further 
complication is that judgements will often have to be made about the acceptable 
balance between short term gains and longer term losses. 
     In short, it is easier to identify the challenges and concerns involved in using 
nudges than to quantify the prospects of making a good case for nudging in any single 
context or more generally as a tool of governmental influence. 
 
ANOTHER TOOL IN THE BOX? 
 At first glance, the safest conclusion to draw about nudge would seem to be that this 
may not be the complete answer to governmental control but it is, at least, a very 
useful device to have in the regulatory / non-regulatory toolbox of influences over 
conduct. Further consideration, however, suggests that this conclusion builds too 
readily on a particular conception of the toolbox of state control devices: one in which 
different regulatory and non-regulatory tools take their places in an harmonious group 
(a sort of seven dwarves choir of governance).  
      The reality is often that different such tools may compete rather than co-ordinate 
harmoniously. In the first instance, the tools may vie for political prominence. Thus 
the House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee expressed the concern 
in 2011 that the UK government’s promotion of behaviour change strategies was 
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blocking out consideration of other intervention strategies.
88
 This typifies the worry 
that when politicians and ministers fall in love with a certain newly fashionable policy 
style or mode of intervention, they tend to be blind to the virtues of the more 
traditional approaches. This is a danger that can be responded to (at least partially) 
with a First Degree nudge – as exemplified by the Science and Technology 
Committee issuing a reminder to the Government that it should not forget that a range 
of policy tools is available. 
      There is, moreover, a second more structural worry about seeing control tools as 
an essentially harmonious package of options. Different regulatory and non-regulatory 
tools of intervention operate with different logics in so far as they establish different 
relationships with targeted persons and use varying ways of making demands of such 
targets.
89
 The covert aspect of  Second and Third Degree nudges involves little 
dialogue between the nudger and the target. Indeed, as noted above, an openness of 
dialogue can be expected to remove much of the force from certain types of nudge. 
This contrasts with the position in more traditional regulation when steps are taken 
routinely to clarify requirements, explain what compliance demands and so on. The 
problem in combining intervention tools such as commands and nudges is that they 
may undermine each other – it is difficult to establish a control relationship that is 
based on openness, and, at the same time, to use nudges by stealth. The effect of 
introducing nudging into an area may, thus,  be to reduce the effectiveness and the 
transparency of other modes of intervention and to detract from the broader regime of 
control. This point was made above in noting that a problem of using nudges in the 
medical field is that this can destroy the trust relationships that underpin the other 
interactions between patients and physicians.
90
 
      A third problem in seeing the nudge as just another tool in the box is that choices 
of different intervention tools are governed by different philosophies of control and of 
state/individual relationships. It has been seen above that nudging operates on the 
basis of libertarian paternalism so that flawed individuals’ decisions stand to be 
corrected by the state so as to increase citizens’ welfare. With Second and Third 
Degree nudges, the basis of the nudge is an exploitation of the limited cognitive, 
volitional and emotional capacities of individuals. The idea in such paternalism, is not 
to take steps in order to increase the quality of individuals’ rational, conscious 
decision-making, it is to accept peoples’ flaws and use these to advantage.  
      The difficulty regarding the toolbox is that some tools of intervention operate on 
quite different philosophical and ethical assumptions from those that underpin 
nudge.
91
 Classical command and control rules of regulation, and economic incentives, 
tend to build on the rationality of persons and firms – they issue prescriptions that are 
overt  because they take it that people will use their rationality to react positively to 
the threats of sanctions or taxes. Enforcement practices tend to work on a rational 
deterrence basis, and models such as the ‘responsive regulation’ approach,  treat 
regulated persons and firms as cognitively competent responders to overtly issued 
messages. 
      The implication of these differences is that nudge does not sit wholly happily 
alongside many other intervention tools. Choices have to be made about the position 
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that the state wants to adopt regarding targeted individuals – is their autonomy to be 
respected and their rationality to be openly worked with, or is their autonomy to be  
reduced and their decision-making to be nudged by stealth? A decision by a 
government to adopt one of these philosophies rather than the other involves a 
disposition for or against using nudges as opposed to more traditional methods. For 
this reason, a vision of the nudge as just another potentially useful intervention tool 
may be one that is too easily arrived at.  
        This is not to argue that nudges have no role within government, it is to caution 
that, when choosing when to nudge rather than intervene in another way, it is essential 
to be clear and open about the philosophical basis for such a choice as well as to be 
aware that different modes of intervention may operate with clashes of logic that 
threaten not only effectiveness but also the serving of representative and ethical ends.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The nudge has burst on the scene in the last decade and it has proved enormously 
alluring to certain governments, including those of the UK and USA. There are, 
however, dangers in embracing the nudge uncritically. A first problem has been that 
the nudge has often been discussed, at least in policy circles, with a lack of conceptual 
precision. This article has sought to address this deficiency by distinguishing between 
three distinct degrees of nudge and by exploring the different concerns that relate to 
nudges of these three orders. This, at least, ensures that the case for nudging in a 
given context will not be assessed on the assumption that all behaviour change 
strategies are as benign as the First Degree nudges described here. 
     It has been seen that it is difficult to state, in precise terms, the conditions under 
which nudging can be used effectively and acceptably. This is because there are 
numbers of different nudging tools and three different degrees of nudging severity to 
be taken into account alongside varieties of target. It has been possible, however, to 
identify the challenges and concerns that are posed by nudges of different degrees and 
to assess the extent to which these can be responded to in positive terms. 
   It should be emphasised, finally, that the above parade of reservations about nudges 
does not prompt the conclusion that the nudge should be abandoned. The argument 
here is that the nudge strategy must be used with precision and an awareness of both 
its limitations and its fit within the range of state interventions. The three degrees of 
nudge are here to stay and there will be more instances of behaviour change – one can 
only ask of the nudge: ‘When will I see you again?’ 
